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These critical suggestions notwithstanding, both these rich, carefully 
argued books make significant advances in developing positions their au¬
thors had previously sketched, but in ways that—to sceptics—raised as 
many questions as answers. The gap between Kierkegaardian narrativists 
and narratosceptics may now be narrower than hitherto. But the process 
of exploring the disagreement in detail has brought to the surface valuable 
discussions the content of which I suspect was previously unimagined by 
contributors on either side of the debate. 
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, by Derk Pereboom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 219 pages. $45 (hardcover). 
LE1GH V1CENS, Augustana College (Sioux Falls, SD) 
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life presents a "reworked and expanded 
version" of the view that Derk Pereboom first developed thirteen years ago 
in Living Without Free Will1 (4). Pereboom's position may be categorized as 
free w i l l skepticism, the view that it is unlikely that we have the sort of 
free w i l l required for "basic desert" moral responsibility. While the book 
contains one new chapter on the possibility of rational deliberation, most 
chapters present updated versions of arguments for claims he has previ¬
ously defended. Pereboom evidently takes seriously objections that have 
been raised against his reasoning, spending a good portion of the book 
responding to them, and the newer material is exploratory in tone, giving 
the impression that he is open to further objections and modifications of 
his position. (At one point he even suggests that "the resolute incompati-
bilist" is as unreasonable as the "resolute compatibilist" and "confirmed 
agnostic" on the issue of the compatibility of free w i l l and determinism, 
since none is prepared to change her mind in light of further considerations 
(94).) The book as a whole provides the philosopher of free w i l l wi th much 
food for thought, and is admirable in its insistence that our practices of 
holding each other responsible are not immune to theoretical challenges, 
but must be considered (and reconsidered) in light of what we know and 
don't know about the nature and extent of human freedom. Below I raise 
a few critical questions about the structure and cogency of Pereboom's 
arguments for free w i l l skepticism, as presented in the first few chapters of 
his book, before going on to discuss the significance of his "articulation 
of [the] practical components" of his position, in the later chapters. 
1 N e w York: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 2001. 
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Chapter 1, Pereboom says, is "devoted to arguing for the source view" 
of free w i l l . But it is not immediately obvious how this argument is sup¬
posed to go, or how it is supposed to relate to Pereboom's case for free 
w i l l skepticism. Instead of being presented with an explanation of what 
sourcehood amounts to or an argument for why we should think this is 
the crux of freedom, the reader finds herself plunged headlong into a long 
and complex discussion of Frankfurt counterexamples to the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities, according to which an agent is responsible for 
her action only if she had the ability to do otherwise. Pereboom says that 
he is arguing for the source view "by way of" a Frankfurt example (5), but 
it is unclear why, if it turns out that moral responsibility does not require 
alternative possibilities, this should give us reason to think that "responsi¬
bility is to be explained by the agent's being the actual source of her action 
in a specific way" rather than by some other feature (9). A n d it is further 
unclear why it matters whether the source account is right, since Pere-
boom makes no explicit reference to sourcehood in his later arguments for 
free w i l l skepticism. His manipulation argument for the conclusion that 
determinism is incompatible wi th free w i l l relies only on the premises that 
certain kinds of manipulation rule out free w i l l , and that there is no rel¬
evant difference between such cases of manipulation and cases i n which a 
person's action is determined by the laws of nature and events beyond her 
control. A n d his disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarian-
ism depends only on the premises that on an event-causal indeterministic 
account of free w i l l , nothing settles whether a person's decision occurs, 
and that this is incompatible wi th the control necessary for freedom. None 
of these claims obviously depend on a particular (source) account of free 
w i l l ; rather, both simply appeal to our intuitions about cases in which 
agents are not in control of or responsible for what they do. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, in which Pereboom argues against event-causal lib-
ertarianism, agent-causal libertarianism, and compatibilism, respectively, 
are more to the point. Pereboom's argument against event-causal libertari-
anism seems to have changed since Living Without Free Will. In that earlier 
book, his arguments that event-causal indeterminism and determinism 
both rule out the sort of free w i l l required for moral responsibility relied 
on the same principle (O): that in order for an agent to be morally re¬
sponsible for making a decision, "the production of this decision must be 
something over which the agent has control, and an agent is not morally 
responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she 
has no control" (2001, 47). As Pereboom noted, according to (O), an agent 
cannot be responsible for decisions determined to occur by factors beyond 
her control; but neither can she be responsible for decisions that are not 
produced by anything at all. He then argued that on the event-causal liber¬
tarian picture, the production of a free decision is "only a combination of 
[these] . . . two types of responsibility-undermining factors," since events 
beyond the agent's control are indeterministic causes of the agent's deci¬
sion, "while there is nothing that supplements the causal contribution of 
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these factors" to produce the decision. Thus, he concluded, an agent can¬
not be responsible for decisions that are merely indeterministically caused 
by agent-involving events (2001, 47). In Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in 
Life, in contrast, Pereboom argues that event-causal libertarianism "can¬
not accommodate the requirement that in an indeterministic context the 
agent or something about the agent settle whether the decision in question 
occurs" (5, emphasis added). This principle may seem more controversial 
than (O), and is not defended anywhere in the book. While 1 find the prin¬
ciple intuitive, an event-causal libertarian may complain that it begs the 
question against her view, since "settle" seems to mean "determine," and 
the event-causal libertarian denies that an action must be determined in 
order to be under the agent's control. Thus Pereboom's argument could be 
strengthened by motivating the key principle underlying his disappearing 
agent objection to event-causal libertarianism. 
In chapter 3, Pereboom takes aim at agent-causal libertarianism, but 
here his stance is more provisional. He argues that "the difficulty of 
integrating reasons-explanation, together with issues several critics have 
raised for our conception of agent-causal control, count against the co¬
herence of this position"—though these concerns "don't go so far as to 
definitely establish its incoherence" (5-6). 1n the end, though, Pereboom 
says that the main problem wi th agent-causal libertarianism is that "our 
best empirical theories yield strong reasons to doubt that we are in fact 
agent causes of the sort that this theory specifies" (50). Pereboom's treat¬
ment of the various coherence objections to agent-causal libertarian-
ism—some of which he proposes responses to—is, if not totally novel, 
still penetrating, and w i l l hopefully occasion further debate on the issues. 
Of particular note is his discussion of whether agent-causation is compat¬
ible wi th the existence of universal laws of a statistical nature. Pereboom 
argues here (as he d id in Living Without Free Will) that it would be a " w i l d 
coincidence" if agent causes acted just as these laws would predict. But, 
he says, we have no evidence that agent-causes are "strongly emergent," 
in the sense that their activities are not wholly governed by probabilistic 
laws of micro-physics but diverge f rom what those laws would predict. 
While 1 think he is right about the difficulty of squaring universal proba¬
bilistic laws with agent-causal libertarianism, if this is his main reason 
for rejecting agent-causal libertarianism—which he thinks, conceptually, 
is our only hope of having free wi l l—it would nice to have some discus¬
sion of the actual evidence of such universal laws. Though Pereboom 
discusses Timothy O'Connor's agent-causal view in detail, nowhere does 
he consider the work of O'Connor and others on the evidence for the 
existence of strongly emergent phenomena, for instance, in O'Connor and 
Carradini's recent edited volume Emergence in Science and Philosophy.2 N o r 
does he discuss the work of such philosophers as E. J. Lowe and Helen 
2Routledge, 2010. 
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Steward, 3 who argue that their respective versions of agent-causal liber-
tarianism are both consistent wi th what science actually tells us about the 
world, and plausible in their own right. 
In chapter 4, Pereboom rehearses his manipulation argument against 
compatibilism. The purpose of this argument is two-fold: first, to show 
that the most developed compatibilist accounts of free w i l l do not specify 
conditions sufficient for the sort of freedom required for moral responsibil¬
ity, since such accounts are compatible wi th freedom-undermining sorts 
of manipulation; and second, to raise a "challenge" for the compatibilist, 
to point out a "relevant and principled difference" between such cases of 
freedom-undermining manipulation, on the one hand, and cases i n which 
an agent's action is simply determined by the laws of nature and events 
beyond her control, on the other (75). The majority of the chapter is spent 
responding to criticisms of the argument put forth by A l f r e d Mele, John 
Fischer, Michael McKenna, and others. Pereboom admits that his argument 
is properly construed not as a deductively val id argument, but as an infer¬
ence to the best explanation for why his cases of manipulation are in fact 
freedom-undermining (his proposed explanation being that the actions 
are causally determined by factors beyond the agent's control). For this 
reason, the manipulation argument may be considered inherently weaker 
than other arguments for incompatibilism, such as the Consequence argu¬
ment. However, one strength of Pereboom's argument is, as he puts it, that 
it serves as "a vehicle for making the supposition of causal determination 
salient in a way that effectively brings it to bear" on judgments of moral 
responsibility which may have been formed on the assumption that our 
actions are not determined by factors beyond control our (88). This point 
can also serve as a response to the compatibilist approach that McKenna 
considers, according to which Pereboom's argument shows that the agents 
are responsible for their actions i n the manipulation cases, since there is no 
relevant difference between such cases and the "standard" deterministic 
one. Since, Pereboom argues—rightly, to my mind—that the manipula¬
tion cases are "formulated so as to correct for inadequacy in the extent to 
which we take into account hidden deterministic causes i n our intuitions 
about ordinary cases" (that is, to a not-great-enough extent), it would be 
problematic for the compatibilist to allow her intuition about the "stan¬
dard" case to influence her intuition about the manipulation case, rather 
than vice versa (95). 
While the first half of the book constitutes Pereboom's case for free 
w i l l skepticism, the second half focuses on the implications of this view 
for rational deliberation, reactive attitudes, blame and punishment, and 
a sense of achievement, among other things. Pereboom's assessment is 
that, on the whole, not much that we find meaningful or valuable in life 
would be lost to us if we accepted his skeptical position. O n the other 
3See, for instance, E. J. Lowe's The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (Oxford Universi ty 
Press, 2008), and Helen Steward's A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford Universi ty Press, 2012). 
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hand, he maintains that we would do well without most of the attitudes 
and practices that depend on the assumption of basic desert responsibility. 
For instance, while resentment, indignation and retributivist punishment 
are unjustified on the free w i l l skeptic's account, Pereboom argues that 
resentment and indignation are not essential to good personal relation¬
ships, while retributive punishment is objectionable on grounds indepen¬
dent of the free w i l l debate. A n d other attitudes and practices which really 
are essential to good relationships and human flourishing can be retained. 
For instance, even without the assumption of basic desert, we can still dis¬
courage vicious behavior and encourage virtue, protect the innocent while 
respecting the rights of offenders, and express such attitudes as guilt, 
repentance, forgiveness, and love (or at least close analogues of these). 
While 1 find much of Pereboom's proposals in these chapters convinc¬
ing, regarding what meaning and value i n our lives could be retained if 
we embraced free w i l l skepticism, a question raised for me is whether 
Pereboom has left anything of importance out of his considerations. For 
instance, one issue he does not address i n the book is whether the sort 
of control he thinks is ruled out by both determinism and event-causal 
libertarianism is necessary not only for free agency, but for agency itself. 
If that were the case, then the skepticism he counsels wou ld have dev¬
astating effects on our self-conception, to which agency is fundamental. 
Furthermore, in chapter 5, before arguing that rational deliberation is 
compatible wi th the assumption that one's decision w i l l ultimately be 
determined by factors beyond one's control (so long as one is not certain 
what she w i l l do, and believes i n the efficacy of her deliberative process), 
Pereboom notes, " A further issue is raised by the plausible contention 
that i n rational deliberation we presuppose that as agents we are able 
to settle which decision occurs" (105). This wou ld seem to suggest that, 
on Pereboom's own view, we might not capable of rational deliberation 
after all . For on his view, event-causal indeterminism definitely rules out 
the agent's "settling" what she w i l l do, and event-causal determinism 
may as well . Pereboom remarks, "I won't weigh i n on this debate, be¬
cause given my aims, I don't need to. Deterministic agent-causal theory 
of action is available to the free w i l l skeptic, and so there is a skeptic-
friendly position, which could i n fact be true, on which an agent's power 
to settle which decision occurs is secure enough" (105). But it is unclear 
if Pereboom's objections to the coherence and/or empirical plausibility of 
agent-causal libertarianism wou ld apply also to a deterministic agent-
causal theory, and if so, whether such a position "could in fact be true." 
If it couldn't, then rational deliberation might be out the window, and 
Pereboom's free w i l l skepticism w o u l d again turn out to have more dire 
consequences for our self-conception as rationally deliberative agents 
(not to mention for our practice of rational deliberation) than he seems 
ready to acknowledge. 
Despite these omissions in Pereboom's treatment of the practical conse¬
quences of free w i l l skepticism, his extensive exploration of the issues is 
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impressive. Pereboom forcefully argues that anyone who is even moder¬
ately moved by his arguments to doubt the existence of free w i l l must take 
seriously the implications of such skepticism for our practices of blame and 
punishment, since such practices inflict serious harm on their targets, and 
"justification for harm must meet a high epistemic standard" (158). His 
insistent reminder that our debates about the nature and extent of human 
freedom in the metaphysics classroom have implications for everything 
f rom public policy to personal relationships — and that these implications 
must be faced squarely by free w i l l theorists—is to be applauded. 
Anselm's Other Argument, by A . D . Smith. Cambridge, M A : Harvard U n i -
versity Press, 2014. 256 pages. $49.95 (hardback). 
K A T H E R I N ROGERS, University of Delaware 
A . D . Smith takes a winding and uneven route to what 1 find an exciting 
and plausible conclusion: Whether or not Anse lm intended it, there is a 
val id and persuasive argument for the existence of G o d to be found—or at 
least suggested—in Anselm's Replies, that is, in his responses to Gaunilo's 
criticisms of the Proslogion II argument. O n the way to this conclusion, 
Smith argues that, contrary to the views of some, Anselm does not pres¬
ent a Moda l Ontological Argument in Proslogion III, or indeed anywhere 
else. In order to make his case against any modal argument and i n favor 
of the "other" argument of the title, Smith sets out what he takes to be 
Anselm's position on the nature of "conceivability" and "possibility." The 
book, then, is an attempt both to present Anselm's own thinking on some 
issues which are key to certain sorts of proofs for the existence of God, and 
to develop and defend an argument inspired by Anselm's Replies. 
Smith's discussion of Anselm's understanding of conceivability and 
possibility is not as thorough as it might be, and it contains some unneces¬
sary digressions. One such digression offers a brief overview of Anselm's 
position on the question of whether or not there is a best world, such that a 
perfectly good G o d "must" actualize it. The issue comes up in connection 
with Anselm's approach to counterfactuals, but the discussion, though 
several pages long, is not substantive enough to settle the question in terms 
of interpreting Anselm, does not contribute to the perennial philosophical 
debate, and does not seem to have much bearing on Anselm's approach 
to counterfactuals. One can make sense of counterfactuals whether or not 
one holds that ours is the only wor ld a perfect G o d could actualize. 
Regarding the rather "quick" interpretation of Anselm on conceivability 
and possibility, Smith does offer some historical perspective, but it is in the 
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